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Paul Tillich and the Academic Culture of  Modernity 
WESSEL STOKER  
Is theology a science? The scientific nature of theology is the subject of a 
great deal of discussion at present. The view articulated by Paul Tillich on 
this issue is relevant for that discussion. For Tillich, theology is a public 
concern. Theology’s field of attention includes not only the church but 
society and the academy as well. Here we want to look at Tillich’s theol-
ogy in relation to the academy, to academic culture. In his view, the task 
of theology is to mediate between the Christian faith and the experience 
of individuals and groups.1 Does this mediation obtain also for the rela-
tion between faith and academics or science? Can Christian theology be a 
science and thus part of the academic culture? In the first half of the pre-
vious century logical positivism was the dominant epistemological theory, 
not only in Europe but also in the Anglo-American world.2 This view of 
science and knowledge wanted little to do with theology and metaphysics. 
According to the manifesto drawn up in 1929, Wissenschaftliche Weltauf-
fassung: Der Wiener Kreis, it was even promoted a scientific worldview 
that held that, for science, there were no unsolvable riddles: 
“Neatness and clarity are striven for, and dark distances and unfathomable 
depths rejected. In science there are no ‘depths’; there is surface everywhere: 
all experience forms a complex network, which cannot always be surveyed 
and can often be grasped only in parts. Everything is accessible to man; man 
is measure of all things […] The scientific world-conception knows no un-
solvable riddle.” 3 
                             
1  P. Tillich, The Protestant Era (1948), in: Id., Main Works VI, ed. by G. Hummel, 
Berlin/New York: De Gruyter & Evangelisches Verlagswerk 1992, 289 (MW); 
see also P. Tillich, Gesammelte Werke, ed. by R. Albrecht, Stuttgart Evangeli-
sches Verlagswerk (1959-1975), 7, 13 (GW).     
2  A. J. Ayer, Language, Truth and Logic, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004.      
3  Wissenschaftliche Weltauffassung: Der Wiener Kreis has no official author. See 
O. Neurath, Gesammelte philosophische und methodologische Schriften I, ed. by 
R. Haller & H. Rutte, Wien: Verlag Hölder-Pichler-Tempsky 1981, 305 (English O. 
Neurath: Empiricism and Sociology, Dordrecht: Kluwer 1973, 306). 
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Following the model of physics, logical positivism viewed science as uni-
fied science (Einheitswissenschaft). The attempt was made to express the 
different areas of science in a common and mutually comprehensible lan-
guage. Only such a unified science can establish what is true or not true; 
empirical verification is therefore the norm, which is why this theory of 
epistemology is also called logical empiricism. Only statements that can be 
empirically verified are meaningful. Theology, therefore, cannot be a sci-
ence because theological statements are meaningless, i.e. cannot be em-
pirically verified. 
Tillich had written his Das System der Wissenschaften nach Gegenstän-
den und Methoden six years before this manifesto appeared (1923). Unlike 
logical positivism, he distinguished between the sciences and includes 
theology among the human sciences (die Geistes- oder Normwissen-
schaften). Theology is a theonomic metaphysics that belongs to the hu-
man sciences.4 His philosophy of meaning shows that the coherence of 
meaning is guaranteed by an unconditional meaning.5 He thus points to 
the theonomic character of knowledge, the notion that thinking is rooted 
in the unconditional as ground of meaning and as abyss. When speaking 
about God theology discusses in an explicit way that which is an implicit 
presupposition of knowing. Tillich thus wants to show that theology is 
possible as science.6 The later Tillich (Tillich after emigrating to the US in 
1933) would develop his view of theology in the first part of Systematic 
Theology and emphasize its church character. In Systematic Theology the 
postulate of the unconditional functions as a presupposition of under-
standing of spiritual things (Geisteswissenschaft) and in philosophy of 
religion (ST I, 12).7 He no longer considers a Christian theologian as a 
scientific theologian in the ordinary sense of “scientific” (ST I, 13).  
Two worlds – that of scientific culture and that of Christian theology 
– clashed with each other in Tillich’s time. During the 1960s the scientific 
climate slowly changed and logical positivism was considered untenable. 
But Tilllich did not experience this changed climate, which has been much 
more favourable for theology since the 1960s. 
4  P. Tillich, Das System der Wissenschaften nach Gegenständen und Methoden 
(1923), GW I, 274f. (MW I, 247f.).    
5  P. Tillich, Religionsphilosophie (1925), GW I, 318 (MW IV, 132).  
6  P. Tillich, Auf der Grenze (1962), GW XII, 35f.  
7  P. Tillich, Systematic Theology, 1-3, London: James Nisbet 1968. The numbers in 
the text refer to his Systematic Theology (ST), and to the three volumes (I-III), 
rather than the five parts.  
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I will investigate how the later Tillich viewed theology as science and 
the relationship between theology and science in his Systematic Theology 
(1951). Because this has to do with his view of theology in relation to the 
dominant scientific climate, we should look at the following topics.8 How 
does he account for theology to those who are outside the circle of theol-
ogy (par. 1.1) and for the Christian character of his theology as church 
theology to the faith community (par. 1.2)? How does he deal with the 
academic/scientific demand for verification (par. 1.3) and with the criti-
cism of faith and theology made by science (par. 1.4)? I will thereby also 
refer to his use of the prevailing view of rationality. I will subsequently ex-
plore how Tillich’s concern that theology be a public, academic affair can 
better come into its own in the new climate of the more recent philosophy 
of science.  
1. Tillich on the Scientific Character of Theology 
1.1 The Postulate of the Unconditional: The Foundation of the      
Human Sciences 
How does Tillich account for his view of theology over against the sci-
ences? He points to the epistemological circle of the human sciences and 
philosophy of religion adds the smaller, theological, circle of Christian 
theology to it. The epistemological circle rests on the unconditional that is 
the foundation of knowledge in the human sciences. Tillich thus relies on 
a train of thought he had developed earlier in his Das System der Wissen-
schaften and in other writings from the 1920s. He inquires into the condi-
tion of knowledge and, like the Augustinian-metaphysical tradition, finds 
that in the unconditional, which he calls God. The unconditional, the idea 
of God, is the foundation of knowledge; it precedes our theoretical judge-
ment and is its basis. But how do we have knowledge of God? God comes 
from God and that is why we cannot come to him via the world, via the 
conditional, as Tillich explains in connection with the concept of religion. 
To attempt to do so would turn God into a correlate with the world and 
8  In addition to positivism, Tillich also cites Neo-Kantianism, phenomenology, and 
pragmatism. Because of logical positivism’s dominant position, I will limit myself to 
that.  
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because Tillich will later base Christian theology on the (Christian) logos 
                             
would merge him with it.9 There is no indirect or mediate path to God – 
only the immediate path of the intuition (Intuition). People appear to be 
aware of the unconditional, of God. “Certainty about God is certainty 
about the unconditional contained in and grounding the I’s certainty about 
itself”.10 The unconditional, the idea of God, is its own proof: we are 
immediately aware of it. 
This postulate of the unconditional is described in Tillich’s works in 
different contexts, always with the attribute “immediacy” of the intui-
tion.11 Thus, the later Tillich calls this the ontological principle of the 
philosophy of religion according to which the human being has an imme-
diate sense of God that precedes all division and interaction between sub-
ject and object in science. Like Augustine, he calls God truth. “Veritas is 
presupposed in every philosophical argument; and veritas is God”.12 Ac-
cording to him, the unconditional, being itself, and the biblical God con-
ge.  
In his Systematic Theology Tillich shows that the foundation of knowl-
edge for theology, along with the human sciences and phi
, is the unconditional. He calls it the mystical a priori:  
“ […] [A]n immediate experience of something ultimate in value and being of 
which one can become intuitively aware […] a mystical a priori, an awareness 
of som
11f.) 
This circle of the unconditional is operative in the human sciences: “every 
understanding of spiritual things (Geisteswissenschaft) is circular” (ST I, 
12). The unconditional can only be encountered if it is already present. 
Thus, Tillich wants to make clear that the idea of God is already implied 
in knowledge in the human sciences. And thus this postulate of the un-
conditional can function as a gateway to Christian theology which speaks 
explicitly about God. This legitimizes theology for those outside the theo-
logical circle. That is, indeed, a preliminary and incomplete legitimation 
9  P. Tillich, Die Überwindung des Religionsbegriffs in der Religionsphilosophie 
(1922), GW I, 369 (MW IV, 75).   
10  P. Tillich, Die Überwindung des Religionsbegriffs, GW I, 378 (MW IV, 82); P. 
Tillich, Dynamics of Faith, MW V, 253 (GW VIII, 143). 
11  P. Tillich, Two Types of Philosophy of Religion (1946), MW IV, 296 (GW V, 
131). 
12  P. Tillich, Two Types of Philosophy of Religion, MW IV, 290 (GW V, 124); P. 
Tillich, Kairos und Logos, GW IV,54f (MW I, 278).     
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doctrine. Before looking at the theological circle, I will first comment on 
the postulate of the unconditional. 
Tillich here makes use of the metaphysical tradition in which the con-
cept of God has a foundational function in epistemology. With Grube, I 
wonder if this postulate can do the job of giving Christian theology an 
epistemological legitimation.13 My questions here arise because of the 
following concerns.  
1. In itself, in my view, a metaphysical concept of God can be recon-
ciled with the personal biblical God.14 The problem here is that there is no 
direct line from the unconditional to the biblical, personal God. That de-
mand has to be made because this postulate serves as a gateway to Chris-
tian theological discourse about the biblical God. In the Christian faith, 
God is indeed the starting point for knowledge and of truth, but – and 
that is the issue here – can the postulate of the unconditional function as 
an objective given in epistemology?  
2. Epistemologies are usually formulated now without such a meta-
physical foundation. Kant no longer based knowledge of phenomenal 
objects in the concept of God but in the transcendental subject. In later 
phenomenology since Heidegger the gulf between subject and object was 
bridged without appealing to the concept of the “mystical a priori” be-
cause the life world of human beings was the starting point and scientific 
knowledge was viewed as derived from that, as knowledge that was lim-
ited with respect to method.  
3. Another objection is that the postulate is immune to criticism be-
cause it is immediate and therefore unprovable. With his search for a sure 
foundation Tillich is dependent on classical foundationalism which re-
quires undoubted starting points on which the structure of knowledge can 
be erected.  
13  D-M Grube, Unbegrundbarkeit Gottes? Tillichs und Barths Erkenntnistheorien 
im Horizont der gegenwärtigen Philosophie, Marburg: N.G. Elwert Verlag, 52f., 
220f.   
14  W. Stoker, Can the God of the Philosophers and the God of Abraham be Recon-
ciled? On God the Almighty, in: G. Hummel, D. Lax (Eds.), Being versus Word in 
Paul Tillichs Theology, Berlin/New York: De Gruyter 1999, 206-224.  
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1.2 The Theological Circle: Theology on the Basis of a Faith Position 
Apart from the postulate of the unconditional, theology also agrees with 
the other sciences in its rational character. It is rational semantically be-
cause of its clear use of concepts, logically because it does not admit any 
contradictions – although it does admit paradoxes – and methodologically 
because systematic theology is a coherent whole (ST I, 59-66). But, ac-
cording to Tillich, theology also differs from other sciences in that, al-
though it does work within the circle of the human sciences and philoso-
phy of religion, its own circle is narrower. The criterion of the Christian 
message is added to this postulate of the unconditional, as he says in what 
follows: 
“But the circle within which the theologian works is narrower than that of 
the philosopher of religion. He adds to the ‘mystical a priori’ the criterion of 
the Christian message.” (ST I, 12)   
It is the task of the systematic theologian to explain the Christian message, 
in which the norm is ‘the New Being in Jesus as the Christ’ (ST I, 56). Of 
importance for us is what Tillich remarks about the church theologian 
entering the theological circle. Such a theologian has to stop speaking 
about himself “as a scientific theologian in the ordinary sense of ‘scien-
tific’” (ST I, 13). Why? Because the theologian abandons the terrain of 
objective science that has no presuppositions, according to logical positiv-
ism, and enters the theological circle where presuppositions do exist. It is 
not Tillich but logical positivism that holds that science is “objective” and 
“without any presuppositions”. Theology is done on the basis of a faith 
position, for theology is, after all, the methodical interpretation of the 
content of the Christian faith and, as such, a function of the church (ST I, 
18). That requires an existential decision by the theologian, a commitment 
to the content of the theological circle as his “ultimate concern” (ST I, 
13).  
Although Tillich could not call the theologian scientific in the usual 
sense of that time, that does not take away from the fact that, for him, 
theology is nevertheless still a public affair, as is also apparent from his 
correlation method. After all, he is searching for a point of contact with 
culture in that. He remarks here that, despite the concrete and special 
character of the Christian message, the theologian claims that that message 
has universal validity over against those who stand outside the theological 
circle. Here he has in mind theologians of other religions as well as secular 
culture. Apologetic theology should show that trends within all religions 
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and cultures all tend toward the Christian answer (ST I, 18). In this con-
text he points to the logos doctrine: the universal logos has taken concrete 
personal form in Jesus. “Christian theology has received something which 
is absolutely concrete and absolutely universal at the same time” (ST I, 19). 
Tillich believes therefore that Christian theology is the theology:  
“The Logos doctrine as the doctrine of the identity of the absolutely concrete 
with the absolute universal is […] the only possible foundation of a Christian 
theology which claims to be the theology.” (ST I, 20)  
We will see below how far this claim of Christian theology as the theology 
can be maintained in contemporary pluralist culture. I am asking that we 
look at the notion of verification that was central in the prevailing scien-
tific climate at that time.  
1.3 Theology and Verification 
With respect to the requirement of verification Tillich does not choose the 
solution proposed by Paul van Buren and Richard Braithwaite who held 
that the Christian faith does not at all concern testing statements regarding 
transcendent entities.15 The Christian faith is about a moral attitude in life. 
The price to be paid here is too high for Tillich because such a view de-
nies the claim of theology to knowledge and truth. 
John Hick and William Alston are those who have come the furthest 
in meeting the requirement of empirical verification for theological state-
ments. Alston investigates direct religious experiences and attempts to indi-
cate an objective moment in them.16 Hick gives an eschatological verifica-
tion of Christian faith statements. Christian faith statements can be tested 
at the end of history; then we will have a good overview of the whole and 
can see if the Christian truth claim is verified.17    
According to Tillich, positivism is right in its claim that verification 
belongs to the nature of truth (ST I, 114). However, he opposes the re-
15  P. M. van Buren, The Secular Meaning of the Gospel, London: SCM Press 1963, 
R. B. Braithwaite, An Empiricist’s View of the Nature of Religious Belief, in: B. 
Mitchell (Ed.), The Philosophy of Religion, Oxford: Oxford University Press 
1971, 72-91.      
16  W. P. Alston, Perceiving God: The Epistemology of Religious Experience. Ithaca 
& London: Cornell University Press 1991.  
17  J. Hick, Theology and Verification, in: B. Mitchell (Ed.), The Philosophy of Relig-
ion, Oxford: Oxford University Press 1971, 53-71.  
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duction of truth to empirical truth, for that does not do any justice to how 
truth should be understood. Truth is to be viewed in a different way from 
how logical positivism views it, i.e. as the “essence of things as well as the 
cognitive act in which their essence is grasped” (ST I, 113). According to 
Tillich, the experimental or empirical method of verification should not be 
made the exclusive pattern for all verification. He speaks about experien-
tial verification and refers to life processes that are the object of biological, 
psychological, and sociological research. The verifying experiences of a 
non-experimental character are truer to life, though less exact and definite. 
He acknowledges the provisional nature of such a experiential verification, 
for the life process itself makes the test. These two methods of verifica-
tion correspond to the two cognitive attitudes, the controlling and the 
receiving:      
“Controlling knowledge is verified by the success of controlling actions […] 
Receiving knowledge is verified by the creative union of two natures, that of 
knowing and that of the known. This test, of course, is neither repeatable, 
precise, nor final at any particular moment. The life-process itself makes the 
test.” (ST I, 114)18   
The requirement of verification obtains also for theological statements. 
Their verification is their efficacy in the life processes of humankind. “They 
prove to be inexhaustible in meaning and creative in power” (ST I, 117). 
Mary Ann Stenger explains this as follows: 
“Do past theological statements or symbols address the current human situa-
tion? What elements of truth from them should be preserved because they 
still hold truth for the present? What new expressions are needed to make 
those truths effective for the present? […] If people experience the theology 
as connecting them with or expressing that which is ultimate, then they will 
verify it. Of course, such commitments and verification involve risk. The sup-
port of people does not necessarily validate truth.”19  
In short, Tillich rejects experimental verification as the exclusive pattern for 
all verification. He acknowledges a parallel method of verification, i.e. expe-
riential verification, for theology and sciences that explore life processes.  
  
18  P. Tillich, Participation and Knowledge, MW I, 385 (GW IV, 111f.). 
19  M. A. Stenger, Tillich’s Approach to Theology and Natural Sciences: Issues of 
Truth and Verification, in: G. Hummel (Ed.), Natural Theology versus Theology 
Nature? Tillich’s Thinking as Impetus for a Discourse among Theology, Philoso-
phy and Natural Sciences, Berlin 1994, 137.   
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1.4 Theology in Relation to the Other Sciences 
I will describe Tillich’s view of the relation between faith (theology) and 
science by means of the schema presented by Ian Barbour, who indicates 
four possible relations. With regard to the present discussion I will also 
give contemporary examples of positions concerning the relation between 
faith and science.20 Ian Barbour sketches four possible positions regarding 
the relation between theology (faith) and science.21  
The first position is that of conflict between faith and science. Tillich 
refers here to Galileo and Darwin. The consequence of the conflict is, he 
claims, a split between religion and secular culture (ST I, 144). An example 
of this position is also logical positivism with its claim that theological 
statements are meaningless. Contemporary examples can be found in the 
scientism of R. Dawkins and E.O. Wilson.22  
The second position is that of independence. Here it is stated that, for 
example, science is concerned with questions of fact and theology with 
questions of meaning. This position proposes a division of the joint prop-
erty of faith and science between them. This can be found in Kant with 
respect to his distinction between physics and (physico-)theology, as well 
as in K. Barth and R. Bultmann.23 Students of Wittgenstein now defend 
this position and consider science and theology to be two different lan-
guage games.  
The third position is that of dialogue; this position looks for methodi-
cal parallels between theology and science. An example of such a parallel 
is that theology and science concern a non-observable reality for which 
both search for a special language, such as models, metaphors, and analo-
gies.  
20  I. Barbour, “Science and Religion, Models and Relations”, in: J. Wentzel van 
Huyssteen (Ed.), Encyclopedia of Science and Religion, New York 2003, 760-
766. 
21  I. Barbour, Science and Religion, Models and Relations, in: J. Wentzel van 
Huyssteen (Ed.), Encyclopedia of Science and Religion, New York: Macmillan 
Reference U.S.A., 2003, 760-766 
22  R. Dawkins, The God Delusion, London 2007; E.O. Wilson, Consilience: The 
Unity of Knowledge, New York 1998.  
23  I. Kant: Critique of Judgment, par. 79-85; Barth: A. L. Molendijk, Aus dem 
Dunklen ins Helle: Wissenschaft und Theologie im Denken von Heinrich Scholz, 
Amsterdam 1991; Bultmann: H. Gollwitzer, Die Existenz Gottes im Bekenntnis 
des Glaubens, München 1968, Hfdst 1; 2.4. 
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The fourth position, i.e. integration, looks for a (partial) integration of 
theology and science. A. Peacocke, the biochemist, provides a theology of 
nature, or people search for a synthesis such as that which can be found in 
Process philosophy.24 The position of integration between faith and sci-
ence can also be found with respect to the humanities. Tillich himself 
points out how, influenced by positivism in historical criticism, research 
was done into the so-called historical Jesus behind the gospels in order to 
provide a minimum of reliable facts about the man Jesus of Nazareth as a 
foundation for the Christian faith (ST II, 121). Tillich rejects this kind of 
historical apologetic as a wrong form of integration.                                                                               
What is Tillich’s position concerning the relation between faith and 
science? Tillich advocates the second position, but this does not, for him, 
exclude the third position, that of dialogue. The object of theology has to 
do with the ultimate concern, and science has to do with penultimate con-
cerns. He draws the subsequent conclusion that knowledge that comes 
from revelation and ordinary knowledge differ with respect to nature and 
therefore do not conflict. “Knowledge of revelation cannot interfere with 
ordinary knowledge” (ST I, 144).25 Not a single result of research in the 
sciences or the humanities can be directly productive or disastrous for 
theology. 
“Theology has no right and no obligation to prejudice a physical or historical, 
sociological or psychological, inquiry. And no result of such an inquiry can be 
directly productive or disastrous for theology.” (ST I, 21).  
For the scientist, knowledge that comes from revelation does not add or 
subtract anything from his scientific description of nature. The same ob-
tains for the historian and the psychologist. This entails that theological 
insights are not be viewed as scientific insights. Theology is concerned 
with existential truth, and that is different from truth in science. 
It seems that, as far as theology is concerned, Tillich, like Peter Winch 
and N. Malcolm, advocates Wittgensteinian fideism, i.e. that the secular and 
religious believers live in different language games and thus in different 
worlds.26 He writes:  
24  A. R. Peacocke, Paths from Science towards God, Oxford 2001. A.N. Whitehead, 
Process and Reality, New York 1978.   
25  P. Tillich, Dynamics of Faith (1957), MW V, 268-270 (GW VIII, 164-168).  
26  P. Winch, Understanding a Primitive Society, Rationality, ed. by B.R. Wilson, 
Oxford: Blackwell 1985, 78-111; N. Malcolm, The Groundlessness of Belief, in: 
S.C. Brown (Ed.), Reason and Belief, Ithaca & London: Cornell University Press 
1977, 143-157.    
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“The knowledge of revelation can be received only in the situation of revela-
tion, and it can be communicated – in contrast to ordinary knowledge – only 
to those who participate in this situation. For those outside this situation the 
same words have a different sound.” (ST I, 143f.) 
Tillich’s position with the postulate of the unconditional is not that of the 
type of two models of the world. He does share with these students of 
Wittgenstein the view of a division of joint property between faith and 
science but differs from them in that he views the Christian faith as cogni-
tive. Theology has insights that are fruitful for science as well. Moreover, 
he is still dependent on the universal and formal view of rationality.  
 Tillich’s choice of a division of faith and science’s joint property be-
tween them can be advantageous in a scientific culture hostile to theology 
in that faith is thus protected against scientific critique. He holds, there-
fore, with respect to historical criticism that “historical research can nei-
ther give nor take away the foundation of the Christian faith” (ST II, 130).  
For Tillich, the division of communal property does not exclude dia-
logue. As said he looks for a methodical parallel between theology and 
sciences with regard to experiential verification. It is also evident from his 
dialogue with the psychologist Carl Rogers.27 Tillich recognizes that if 
people speak about the truth and knowledge that the Christian faith gives, 
then, one cannot escape making some kind of connection between what 
the Christian faith says about knowledge and truth and what the sciences 
say about truth. What theology says about creation is not unconnected 
with what science says about the origin and development of nature and 
the human being. The same obtains for the concept of humanity. The 
insights of psychology and theology can be fruitful for each other, if, as 
stated, the existentially coloured theology is not confused with scientific 
knowledge and truth. In passing, I will draw attention to the fact that the 
later Tillich also remained culture-theologian and has sought dialogue with 
the whole of culture (ST I, 16f.).  
The relation between theology and historical criticism is problematic 
in Tillich. Here it seems to be a matter only of a division of communal 
property and not any kind of dialogue. Historical research into the Bible 
does not have any impact on the Bible as the book of believers. Tillich 
divides the two sharply and therefore has difficulty explaining the histori-
27  C. Rogers: Dialogues H. Kirschenbaum & V. L. Henderson, London: Constable 
1990, 64-78. P. Tillich, How has Science in the Last Century Changed Man’s 
View of Himself (1965), MW II, 374-382 (GW III, 209-217).    
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cal anchoring of the Christian faith in history. The Christian faith cannot 
rest on an uncertain basis like history; faith can guarantee only itself.  
 1.5 Taking Stock 
The task of theology consists, according to Tillich, in mediation. Such 
mediation is possible with respect to theology and the culture of science, 
in the following way.  
1. Theology is a public, academic affair and concerns something that 
plays a role beyond the theological circle in the circle of philosophy of 
religion and human sciences as well. He makes that clear with the postu-
late of the unconditional. Theology makes this unconditional explicit in its 
theo-logy. Moreover, theology agrees with other sciences in its rational 
character. 
 2. Tillich maintains the uniqueness of Christian theology in a scien-
tific climate that is theologically unfriendly by arguing that theology should 
be done from a standpoint of faith, from the theological circle. He cannot 
call Christian theology scientific theology in the sense of what logical posi-
tivism understood by “scientific.” He supplements the account of his 
Christian theology to the church by referring to the theological circle and 
the logos doctrine as explained by Christian theology. 
3. As far as the task of mediation with respect to theology (faith) and 
science is concerned, on the one hand Tillich defends a division of the 
community property between theology (faith) and science. Thus faith is 
immune to scientific critique, particularly historical criticism. On the oth-
er, he is open to dialogue between theology (faith) and science.   
4. Tillich shares the view of rationality found in classical foundational-
ism with the scientific climate of his time. For logical positivism, sense 
data cannot be doubted as a test for meaningful statements. Tillich con-
sidered the unconditional to be the undoubted foundation of the human 
sciences. For the Christian faith he sought an indisputable foundation in 
the self-grounding faith in Christ as the New Being. The consequence of 
this search is that the historical anchoring of the Christian faith in history 
fails. 
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2. Theology in the Climate of More Recent Philosophy of 
Science 
By means of some of the issues mentioned above I will show how Til-
lich’s view of theology in the current academic climate can be considered 
scientific.28 But I will first provide a brief impression of the changed cli-
mate with respect to science. 
2.1 The More Recent Philosophy of Science 
Logical positivism had to give up its demand for empirical verification. 
This was weakened first into the principle of confirmation and later re-
placed by that of falsification with Karl Popper’s critical rationalism.29 
Knowledge is no longer undoubted but fallible and open for correction. 
Hanson’s insight that perception is theory-laden is an important in-
sight in more recent philosophy of science.30 There is no objective per-
ception; rather, perception always occurs within a theoretical framework 
that, like spectacles, colours reality in a certain way. The perceived facts 
are not objective and neutral but theory-laden. The logic-positivistic no-
tion of an objective, neutral science is therefore bankrupt. Duhem and 
Quine produced new insights concerning testing. As a result, Popper’s 
falsification method has also come under scrutiny.31 A crucial experiment 
in Popper’s sense is impossible because one does not know precisely what 
part of one’s theory or which assumptions are refuted by an observation 
or experiment. Thomas Kuhn developed a new view of science, science as 
28  Wolfhart Pannenberg and Nancey Murphy have worked out a proposal for a 
scientific theology against the background of the more recent philosophy of sci-
ence (W. Pannenberg, Theology and the Philosophy of Science, Philadelphia: 
Westminster John Knox Press 1976. N. Murphy, Theology in the Age Scientific 
Reasoning, Ithaca & London: Cornell University Press 1990).   
29  For a general overview see G. van den Brink, Philosophy of Science for Theolo-
gians: An Introduction, Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang 2009.       
30  N.R. Hanson, Patterns of Discovery: An Inquiry into the Conceptual Foundation 
of Science, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1972.  
31  P. Duhem, The Aim and Structure of Physical Theory, Princeton: Princeton 
University Press 1991 (1906); W.V.O. Quine, Two Dogmas of Empiricism, 
W.V.O. Quine, From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge (Mass): Harvard Uni-
versity Press, 1953, 20-46.   
14 Wessel Stoker 
  
                             
paradigm, whereby it is acknowledged that such a paradigm is not neutral 
or objective but rather one perspective on reality.32
The view of rationality also changed in connection with these devel-
opments. A practice-oriented rationality has emerged to take the place of 
classical foundationalism. This no longer concerns a universal and formal 
rationality with self-evident statements on which the structure of knowl-
edge can be erected. Practice-oriented views of rationality claim that ra-
tionality coheres with a certain practice such as those of science, art, relig-
ion, and daily life. Such a practice has its own criteria for rationality. For 
scientific rationality, for example, social evidentialism would also be a 
good option. This holds that people should have reasons before accepting 
a belief as reasonable. Here reasons no longer consist in beliefs that can be 
directly justified but in the judgements of the community of experts. 
Foundationalism no longer plays any role. The only demand that can be 
made is that a belief be reasonably acceptable if one believes it on the 
basis of expert judgement. It is thus acknowledged that knowledge is falli-
ble and open to refutation. The term “social” in social evidentialism 
points out that beliefs must be tested by a community of experts.33 
How would Tillich’s interest in theology as a public, academic affair 
look like in the climate sketched just above? Because we are concerned 
here with the scientific character of theology, I will not discuss his correla-
tion method here. That, after all, has to do with the question of the point 
of contact.34 In connection with the above I will point briefly to two mat-
ters. I will explain Tillich’s theology in the theological circle as a scientific 
theology viewed as a paradigm. Subsequently, I will show how such a 
scientific theology provides explanations. I will indicate a narrative expla-
nation of Jesus as the Christ, whereby the possibility of refutation is ac-
knowledged.  
32  T. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press 21970 (1962).    
33  H. I. Brown, Rationality, London & New York: Routledge 1990.  
34  Tillich’s correlation method, with certain corrections, can, in my view, be used in 
a culture that has become pluralistic. See W. Stoker, Is the Quest for Meaning the 
Quest for God? The Religious Ascription of Meaning in Relation to the Secular 
Ascription of Meaning, Amsterdam & Atlanta 1996, 208-221. The use of a corre-
lation method is disputed by L. Boeve, God onderbreekt de geschiedenis: The-
ologie in tijden van ommekeer, Kapellen: Pelckmans 2006, chapter 2.  
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2.2 Christian Theology as Paradigm 
Tillich held that theology proceeds from a standpoint of faith (the theo-
logical circle) and demands a commitment. That can be explained in terms 
of Kuhn’s view of science by looking at Christian theology as a para-
digm.35 A paradigm is the whole of convictions, assumptions, and norms 
with respect to scientific research by which a community of scientists 
works. Tillich’s demand of a commitment by the theologian with the con-
tent of theology obtains for the scientist in general. The scientist has a 
commitment to the paradigm in which he works and acknowledges that 
experiences interact with a certain pregiven perspective. Science works, in 
other words, not on the basis of an objective starting point and a universal 
rationality but within a paradigm that has the structure of a hermeneutical 
circle. In that respect there is, formally speaking, no difference between 
theology and the other humanities. 
Tillich’s theology has a transcendental aspect, i.e. the postulate of the 
unconditional as a foundation for knowledge.36  Aside from the objec-
tions to it, this does not square with the view of theology as a paradigm, 
for a paradigm does not have an undoubted starting point. Rationality is 
not neutral and objective, but a practice-oriented rationality. The theoreti-
cal suitability of the Christian faith can be shown through providing orien-
tation concerning questions of life and referring to its existential suitability 
by giving a life orientation that makes life qualitatively good.  
A scientific paradigm is fruitful if it gives explanations and (depending 
on the type of science) allows predictions to be made. That also obtains 
for Christian theology as a paradigm. It stands and falls with how convinc-
ing an interpretation can be given on the basis of the Christian faith of 
God, human beings, and the world. Tillich’s claim to show that Christian 
theology is the theology is difficult to maintain in the current pluralistic 
culture. That obtains, of course, for the Christian theologian personally as 
well as for theologians of other religions. But in dialogue he or she is one 
among many. In addition to the Christian theological paradigm, there are 
also the paradigms of the other religions and that of secular worldviews 
such as humanism. Religious truth cannot be decided definitively before 
the eschaton. That is why a dialogue between faiths is necessary. Tillich 
35  Van den Brink also argues for a theology viewed as a paradigm, although without 
using a correlation method, Philosophy of Science, op. cit. (note 29), 193-211.   
36  The later Tillich maintains this, although his attention shifts to a existential ap-
proach. 
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himself provides fruitful insights regarding the relations between the 
Christian faith and the other world religions.37  
2.3 Narrative Explanation and Openness for Historical Criticism 
Because Tillich wanted to protect the Christian faith from criticism by 
science, he could not properly explain how a historical person like Jesus of 
Nazareth is Christ, the New Being. Because of the changed view of sci-
ence and rationality it is now recognized that explanations can also be 
narrative in nature and that stories can have their own form of rationality.  
Tillich compares the gospel writer with an expressionist portrait 
painter who has painted the portrait of Christ as the New Being on the 
basis of Jesus of Nazareth. Here it is a matter of the transforming power 
of the portrait that the gospel writer painted of Jesus with his datable his-
tory. The portrait is, namely, a recreation of the person whose portrait the 
painter has made. We know this person precisely because of the portrait. 
There is only an analogia imaginis, an analogy between the portrait and 
the actual person who is portrayed. 
“But it can be definitely asserted that through this picture the New Being has 
power to transform those who are transformed by it. This implies that there 
is an analogia imaginis, namely, an analogy between the picture and the actual 
personal life from which it has arisen.” (ST II, 132)  
Tillich is right to speak of the surplus value of the portrait of Jesus Christ 
that the gospel writer composes from his sources. But it is not necessary 
to compare this to painting. Imaging not only has to do with the visual 
image of a portrait but also with the semantic renewal that a story provides. 
Instead of explaining the image of the gospel writer of Jesus as the Christ 
via painting, I would emphasize the semantic character of the image in the 
gospel story. Justice is thus done to the explanatory character of theology 
with the recognition of the historical character of the gospel. 
The semantic model of the image is the metaphor and the narrative. 
Metaphors have the ability to say something in terms of something else, 
whereas narratives can say different things at the same time and can thus 
say something new and also give an explanation of apparent contradic-
37  W. Schüssler, E. Sturm, Paul Tillich: Leben-Werk-Wirkung, Darmstadt: Wissen-
schaftliche Buchgesellschaft 2007, 149-158; Religionstheorie und interreligiöser 
Dialog, Internationales Jahrbuch für die Tillichforschung, edit by C. Danz, W. 
Schüssler, E. Sturm, Berlin: Lit Verlag 5, 2009.  
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tions in the behaviour of someone or the coherence of events in some-
one’s life. Imagination is the ability of a storyteller to give coherence to 
heterogenous elements in someone’s life story so that an explanation can 
be given. A gospel writer like Mark gives a narrative explanation that this 
historical person Jesus of Nazareth is the living Son of God. Mark ex-
plains in a narrative way that this Jesus, mighty in word and work, is para-
doxically the suffering Son of Man. To follow his gospel story is to follow 
a narrative reasoning whereby at the end of the story the reader has to 
declare if he found this narrative explanation of Jesus as the Son of Man 
convincing.38  
 To emphasize with Tillich – albeit differently – the image character of 
the gospel story does not remove the question of historical criticism. Be-
cause it concerns the life and works of the historical person Jesus of Naz-
areth we can speak, in distinction from the gospel story as a “world of the 
text,” of a “world behind the text”. The evangelists have forged divergent 
historical sources into their gospel story. The question of the historical 
reliability of the gospels cannot be passed over because the issue here is 
that of a God who acts in the life of Jesus of Nazareth with his datable 
history. That is why, in my view, faith in Christ as the New Being should 
be open to possible historical falsification. In this respect the Christian 
faith is vulnerable to historical criticism. Does it then lack certainty, as 
Tillich held? Faith is a matter of ultimate concern and our commitment is 
complete. Can this commitment be complete here as well?  
How can a total commitment be defended? Is it unreasonable to as-
sent to something completely if we do not have undoubted arguments for 
it? According to the so-called rule of proportionality, the extent of assent 
to something depends on the kind of grounds that we have for something. 
In my view, this rule does not obtain in every situation. There are many 
things in life for which we have little evidence and yet for us they are cer-
tain. In daily life, in politics, and in religion people often have sure beliefs 
without having undoubted arguments for them. The degree of assent 
often exceeds the kind of reasons we have for such assent. That can be 
the case even in science. Whenever a researcher is pursuing a new theory 
or explanation for something, he must initially have a commitment to his 
38  See W. Stoker, Is Faith Rational? A Hermeneutical-Phenomenological Account-
ing for Faith, Leuven: Peeters 2006, 144-160. In interpreting the Gospel, the 
story should have precedence above the symbol so to do justice to the “narrated 
time”. (W. Stoker, Faith, Truth and History, in: G. Hummel  (Ed.), Truth and 
History – A Dialogue with Paul Tillich, Berlin: De Gruyter 1998, 119.       
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research that transcends the grounds for it. The problem is not that we do 
not have any undoubted arguments for the Christian faith. A problem 
does arise if complete assent is equated immediately with a dogmatic as-
sent. That is an assent that does not go into the objections made against 
the belief and yet holds on to that belief, even though one knows that the 
belief is unfounded. 
My conclusion is that, unlike the view of theology in the climate of 
science influenced by logical-positivism in Tillich’s time, his view of the-
ology from the theological circle, can be viewed in the current climate of 
science as scientific theology: theology as a paradigm. A practice-oriented 
rationality no longer makes the strong claim of undoubtability. The im-
munization of the Christian faith with respect to historical criticism is thus 
to be given up. Precisely in that way justice can be done to Tillich’s inter-
est in theology as a public affair, also in the scientific sense. In this con-
nection it is important that Tillich is open to the dialogue with science. 
His theological view of nature can be made fruitful in such a dialogue with 
the sciences.39  
39  Natural Theology versus Theology Nature? Tillich’s Thinking as Impetus for a 
Discourse among Theology, Philosophy and Natural Sciences, op. cit. (note 19), 
1994.   
